T he relations between the European Union and Turkey has undergone significant strategic changes over the past decades, reflecting internal transformations on both sides as well as realities of foreign policy. The current phase of relations is characterized by attempts to rethink cooperation in the context of geopolitical instability, migration crisis and energy dependence, which raises the question of a possible new partnership model between the EU and Turkey. Turkey has the status of a candidate country for European Union membership, and the European Union officially calls Turkey “a key strategic partner on issues such as climate, migration, security, counter-terrorism and the economy.” 

Turkey’s participation in European integration began in 1959. The first significant milestone was the Ankara Association Agreement, signed in 1963, aimed at the progressive establishment of a Customs Union, which was ultimately established in 1995. In 1987, Turkey applied to join the European Economic Community, the predecessor of the European Union. 

Association negotiations started in 2005, however, in 2018, the European Council stated that the talks had reached an impasse. There are a number of political reasons for the suspension of the process, including: 

• a shift away from democracy under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, marked by authoritarian tendencies and a transition to a presidential system following the 2017 referendum, where power is concentrated in the hands of Erdogan, 
• human rights violations, including repression of the media, opposition and civil society,
• weakening the independence of the judiciary and political persecution of opponents,
• foreign policy tensions with the EU, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean (the Cyprus problem), in Syria (involvement in the civil war and pressure on the Kurds) and in relations with Russia (increasingly close cooperation)
• lack of progress in implementing EU-required reforms in the areas of governance, human rights and the rule of law
• Internal disagreements within the EU over Turkey’s membership and shifting strategic priorities. For example, Germany and the UK were generally supportive of Turkey’s EU membership. In contrast, opposition came from countries such as Austria (due to religious and cultural sensitivities), Cyprus, Greece, Denmark (human rights issues),  France (particularly under Emmanuel Macron, due to all of the above issues) and the Baltic States (because of Turkey’s relations with Russia). Turkey is the only country to have recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on November 15, 1983, the day of its declaration of independence. 

Most of these issues are also addressed in the 2024 Turkey Annual Report.  According to the document, Ankara failed to address the EU’s serious concerns about the continued deterioration of democratic standards, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary and respect for fundamental rights. The report also notes that Turkey refuses to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and advocates a two-state solution in Cyprus. At the same time, it emphasizes that Turkey is a key partner of the European Union and the dialogue with Ankara continues in key areas of mutual interest. 

Relations between the European Union and Turkey have always been complex and multi-layered, and the current geopolitical situation, including the war in Ukraine and Donald Trump’s return to the White House in the United States, have influenced perceptions of Turkey in Europe and Turkey’s positioning towards Europe. 

First, it should be noted that Turkey is a strategic partner of the European Union in several areas, three of which should be highlighted. Chief among them is security, as Turkey is the second largest country and military force in NATO, which spends more than 2% of its GDP on defense, and is geographically close to the Middle East. The Turkish army has 481,000 soldiers, and is second only to the US army of 1.3 million. Another important sector is the energy field. Turkey is an important energy transit hub between Europe and the Caspian region, as well as a key partner in securing energy routes. Key infrastructure includes the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), which transports Azerbaijani gas from the Caspian Sea to Europe via Turkey, helping to diversify Europe’s energy resources and reduce dependence on Russian gas. The Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) also connects to the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline at the Greece-Turkey border. Another important project is the Turk Stream pipeline, which transports Russian gas directly across the Black Sea to Turkey and south-eastern Europe, bypassing Ukraine. Moreover, Azerbaijani oil is supplied to the European market via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline. Another infrastructure is the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline, which aims to deliver Turkmen natural gas to Europe via Azerbaijan and Turkey. The third important area is migration, which is a rather painful problem for the EU. The EU-Turkey Statement, signed in 2016, aims to reduce irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, especially to Greece. It envisages that migrants who arrived on Greek islands without authorization should be returned to Turkey. The dialogue between the parties on effective migration management continues today. Special attention is given to border management, combating human trafficking and supporting refugees.  

Today’s global developments create the need to reassess the relationship between the EU and Turkey. The transformation of the world order essentially began with the war in Ukraine, which also entailed changes in EU-Turkey relations. 

Turkey has maintained balanced relations with Russia and Ukraine since the beginning of the war in February 2022. Ankara has repeatedly stated that it supports Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Despite this, Ankara has not joined the West’s anti-Russian sanctions, and at times, it has received Western support on this issue. Moreover, Turkey is one of the key suppliers of military equipment to Ukraine, while continuing its close trade and economic cooperation with Russia. In addition, Russia is Turkey’s largest supplier of natural gas. Russia builds, owns, and will operate the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and sends 7 million tourists annually to Turkey’s Mediterranean resorts. 

Using such dynamics in relations with both Moscow and Kyiv, Ankara has continually offered itself as a mediator. This was the reason for Vladimir Zelensky’s visit to Turkey, in parallel with the first Russian-American meeting in Riyadh on February 18, 2025. During the meeting, the Turkish president said that his country was ready to hold talks on Ukraine, recalling Turkey’s participation in implementing the grain deal, stating that Ankara was ready to provide a platform for negotiations. Although Turkey’s role as a mediator may be valuable to Europe, Ankara’s balancing act could be perceived as a challenge by the European Union, given European countries’ tough stance on Russia. At the same time, Turkey’s geographical and military-political position in the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East makes Ankara an indispensable player in the fight against Russian influence. 

The most important factor for the revision of the EU-Turkey relations is Donald Trump’s policy toward the European Union. U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance more clearly articulated the new administration’s approach to Euro-Atlantic cooperation and security issues at the Munich Security Conference. In his speech, he sharply criticized European countries, accusing them of undermining the foundations of their own security and stability. The U.S. approach to European security and the war in Ukraine, along with activating relations with Russia, confused Europe. The American side remains silent about a common position of the EU and the US on European security issues, or at least the coordination of positions. On the contrary, the United States has clearly stated that it will no longer provide security guarantees to the European Union and that Europe must provide its own security.   

Amid the American policy shift, Turkey is once again raising the issue of full membership in the European Union. Almost every day, Ankara’s statements are heard at the highest level that ensuring security in Europe is impossible without Turkey and that Ankara is ready to resume the EU membership process. Additionally, Turkey is striving to transform itself from a regional power into a larger global player. Ankara sees itself as more prepared for the changing international order, both militarily and economically. In this regard, Turkey claims to be at the center of the changes in Europe and asserts its right to be an equal participant in decision-making processes. 

Despite some negative reactions in Europe, especially in France and Germany, to the domestic political situation in Turkey and the arrest of Istanbul’s mayor, Ekrem Imamoğlu, Recep Erdogan’s main rival in the upcoming presidential elections, the overall response from the European Union has relatively mild, prompting criticism from the Turkish opposition. This proves that Europe is not yet inclined to spoil relations with  Ankara over democracy issues. Turkey’s growing role to the European Union is evidenced by a certain warming of bilateral relations, such as the resumption of the Turkey-EU High-Level Economic Dialogue after a six-year hiatus. Half of all Turkish exports still go to EU markets, and Turkey benefits from its membership in the Customs Union with the EU, which also allows European goods to enter the Turkish market on favorable terms. Given the trade war unleashed by the US president, it is not excluded that the issue of modernization of the Customs Union may arise. The 1996 document has lost its relevance.  

A nother important factor affecting Turkey-EU relations is the overthrow of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, as a result of which Turkey’s influence in the region has increased, including by supporting the new Syrian government. Thus, the EU’s assistance to Turkey will be necessary both to increase its influence in the Middle East and to solve the migrants’ problem. During a visit to Ankara, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen pledged an additional 1 billion euros for an EU-funded program to support Syrian migrants in Turkey. Therefore, Turkey and the European Union can actively cooperate in this direction as well.  

However, Turkey’s expectations for closer cooperation with the European Union are unlikely to be met due to mutual distrust, scepticism and declining democratic tendencies among some EU member states. The distrust of Turkey is deep-rooted. It includes military operations in Syria, a stance in the eastern Mediterranean and blackmailing the EU by threatening to abandon the migration deal. Another problem, is of course, the strained bilateral relations with several EU member states, particularly France, Greece and Cyprus, as well as its policy of balancing between the West and other countries, including Russia. The European Union may also require Turkey to review its relations with Russia, as it takes a tougher stance against Moscow. In such a situation, it is difficult to envisage a resumption of membership talks in the short term. 

It is more likely that Turkey will strengthen defense cooperation with selected European countries, seeking not only arms sales but also joint production, for example with Azerbaijan and Ukraine. Given that Turkey is currently under sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, military cooperation between Ankara and Brussels is logical. The Turkish defense market remains accessible, has significant export potential and supplies products in high demand (Baykar). Such cooperation can certainly restore trust between Turkey and EU member states to some extent. Turkey can also be useful to the European Union by providing military assistance to Ukraine or sending peacekeepers, which Turkey has already indicated its willingness to do, and by sharing European approaches to the problems of the South Caucasus and Central Asia.    

The new ‘transactional  relationship’ defined by US President Donald Trump also applies to Turkey’s relations with the European Union. Their future course will generally be determined by their relationships with other actors. Some European experts believe that the following formula should guide the European Union: Agree on mutual political commitment with Turkey to reaffirm the preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty, Ankara’s implementation of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and return to UN-led discussions on Cyprus. At the same time, it is proposed to consider negotiations on improving the visa regime and deepening the EU-Turkey Customs Union. The third step, according to experts, should comprise the integration of Turkey’s armament supplies into the coalition, the deployment of Turkish military assets in selected Central European countries and the Black Sea. At the same time, Turkey is unlikely to agree to these proposals. Turkey will try to balance relations with the US, EU and Russia, while the EU will try to get what it needs from Turkey by fulfilling Ankara’s minimum conditions. At the same time, it is obvious that in the context of the changing world order, relations between Turkey and the European Union will be reconsidered.