T he U.S. presidential elections in July 2024 was still 6 months away, but the Azerbaijani regime led by President Ilham Aliyev had already made its choice. On July 22, Aliyev spoke at the Global Media Forum held in Shushi, where he revealed this choice. The Azerbaijani side has previously repeatedly criticized incumbent U.S. President Joe Biden, accusing him of a ‘pro-Armenian stance,’ but in this speech, Aliyev actually attempted to finally sever ties with the Democratic administration, opting fully in favor of the Republicans and their candidate, Donald  Trump. Notably, Aliyev was among the first to congratulate Trump following his election. 

Donald Trump has been in office for more than six months, yet the long-anticipated thaw in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations is still not visible. Despite evident pro-Trump sentiment in the Azerbaijani media, Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, which prohibits the U.S. from providing direct assistance to the government of Azerbaijan, remains in force. There have been no major developments in other areas either. While one might speak of the failure of Azerbaijan’s policy towards the United States, Israel has recently been very active in shaping U.S.-Azerbaijani relations. 

Military cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan has long been recognized, but less is known about other areas of their partnership. One notable example is the energy field, where Azerbaijan has become Israel’s key partner. Recently, it was reported that Azerbaijan’s state-owned oil and gas company SOCAR is expanding its presence in the Israeli market and will develop a field abroad for the first time in history. 

The deepening of relations has other manifestations, which are openly discussed in Azerbaijani and Israeli media. It has been noted that Israel has taken the role of mediator in U.S.-Azerbaijan relations. In particular, the Israeli newspaper Jerusalem Post reported that Israel is lobbying the United States to sign a strategic cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan. Additionally, the possibility of Azerbaijan joining the Abraham Accords, which are concluded between Israel and Muslim countries, is under discussion. It is too early to assess the effectiveness of Israeli lobbying, but active efforts are already underway, which do not satisfy other actors in the region.   

Turkey

R elations between Turkey and Azerbaijan have always been at a very high, or as they like to say, ‘brotherly’ level, but even between the closest allies, sometimes problems arise. Last year’s remote debate, when Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan spoke about the Turkish army’s role in the 44-day war and Azerbaijani media reacted harshly, is memorable. However, the main issue now is Israel and Azerbaijan’s close ties with that country. Turkey has not yet publicly raised the issue, but some signs of discontent are already visible. In May this year, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was due to visit Azerbaijan, the two sides had agreed in advance to use Turkish airspace for the flight, but at last minute, Turkey imposed a ban, resulting in the visit not taking place. 

Turkey is not taking tougher measures to keep its ‘junior’ ally away from Israel, which can be explained by several factors. Firstly, it seems that ‘little brother’ no longer agrees with this positioning. Azerbaijan has increased its influence in Turkey for years, becoming the latter’s largest foreign investor (through SOCAR). In addition, Turkey receives a significant part of its energy resources from Azerbaijan. 

Iran

I n the case of Iran, the situation is more complicated. If Turkey and Israel do not threaten each other’s existence, tensions between Iran and Israel steadily rise and peak after October 7, 2023. The two sides have even struck each other’s territory over the past year, and a full-scale air war between Iran and Israel has been underway since 13 June. There is no active fighting at the moment, but this heated conflict could flare up again at any time.  

Against the backdrop of this, it is interesting to trace Iran’s policy towards Azerbaijan. As in the case of Turkey, one hardly hears any open accusations against Azerbaijan for cooperation with Israel, but during the recent aggravation of relations between Israel and Iran, separate accusations against Azerbaijan have appeared in the press, stating that Azerbaijan supports Israel.  Some experts even note that Azerbaijan is ready to provide Israel with a springboard to attack Iran. 

The visit of the new Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian to Azerbaijan and his meeting with Aliyev at the current stage of Iranian-Azerbaijani relations was also notable. The texts of the meeting and the press conference gave the impression that Pezeshkian, the leader of a middle-class country, was meeting with Aliyev, the leader of a superpower. 

There are explanations for all of this. Firstly, Iran has a large ethnic Azerbaijani population, which poses a threat to the country’s national security. Azerbaijan consistently works with this group, strengthening their identity. 

The second reason is the geographical location of Azerbaijan and Iran’s being under severe sanctions. Few countries are willing to cooperate deeply with Iran, including Russia, which can only be reached by land via Azerbaijan. One of Iran’s largest communication projects, North-South, also runs through Azerbaijan. The countries also have problems with the Caspian Sea basin.  

Thus, at the moment, there is a situation in which Azerbaijan has managed to alleviate the concerns of its neighbors regarding relations with Israel. 

In the case of the recent Iran-Israel hostilities, Azerbaijan is currently demonstrating an ambiguous position, which is to be expected based on Azerbaijani foreign policy. Despite very close cooperation with Israel, Azerbaijan avoids expressing open support and even criticized the Israeli side for the attack in one of its statements. 

Back to the United States

O bviously, the United States would not discuss deep cooperation with Azerbaijan, even taking into account the Israeli lobby, if it didn’t have its strategic interests in the region. A strong Azerbaijan can be considered a threat not only to Armenia but also to Iran, which is also in line with US interests. In the context of the common interests of the US, Israel, and Azerbaijan, it can be noted that in March, an article was published on the popular Israeli Jerusalem Post website, which stated that Israel should start supporting the people of ‘South Azerbaijan’ as it could become a serious problem for Iran. The ultimate goal of the support was considered to be the unification of ‘South Azerbaijan’ with Azerbaijan proper. It is obvious that this thesis was most likely used by Jewish sources for propaganda purposes only and has no direct relevance to the United States itself. However, the exploitation of such a thesis once again suggests that Azerbaijan’s role can be seen as a tool to restrain Iran.        

Other common interests include Azerbaijan’s role as a transit country in relations with Central Asian countries. International interest in Central Asia has recently increased, and in this context, Azerbaijan is seen as a suitable partner for the US. 

At first glance, it may seem strange, but Azerbaijan can be seen not only as a counterbalance to Iran, but also to Russia’s regional policy. In recent months, it has been noted that Azerbaijani officials and media often criticize the Russian side quite harshly, without taking any significant retaliatory measures. 

Based on all this, we can conclude that although there is no clear progress in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations, the positions of the two sides coincide or are closely aligned on a number of issues. When we also consider Israel’s mediating role and the policies pursued by the Trump administration, the likelihood of relations developing further over the next 2-3 years appears quite high.