The 12-day war between Iran and Israel has created new challenges and changes in the region. We spoke to Hamidreza Azizi, an Iranian Visiting Fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, about the possible motives, course and consequences of the war. 

-Mr. Azizi, in June we witnessed a completely new situation in Iran-Israel conflict. Unlike the one-day firefights recorded several times last year, this time the hostilities lasted twelve days. Was this war expected,  given that Iran-US talks were underway and the next meeting was scheduled for June 15? Was Israel’s attack on Iran an attempt to disrupt these negotiations or a consequence of the ineffectiveness of the negotiations? 

-There are various opinions as to why this happened during the negotiations. One version is the one you mentioned: Israel didn’t want negotiations to yield results. There is precedent for this: in previous nuclear talks, not only Israel, but also Saudi Arabia and several other countries opposed the process. They believe that the normalization of relations between Iran and the United States is not in their favor. Israel has always believed that discussing the nuclear issue in isolation from the issues of missile weapons and regional influence is not enough. Here is one way of analyzing it. 

Now, when I analyze the situation after the war, taking into account the US position both before and after the war, I think it should be seen in the context of the so-called concept of ‘changing the face of the region.’ Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly stated that they have changed the face of the region and will continue to do so. From the perspective of the Israeli government, the Hamas attack on October 7 was a serious challenge. The response of Iran’s other allies in the Axis of Resistance was also seen in this light. Israel was able to effectively counter these challenges by significantly reducing the capabilities of these axis factions, and now they have seen, and continue to see a great opportunity to eliminate their main problem once and for all. In fact, this presents a great opportunity for both Israel and the United States to alter the regional order. Looking at US policy towards the region in this context, for example, for Barack Obama, the nuclear deal with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, JCPOA) was seen as an opportunity to include Iran in a regional order based on a ‘soft balance.’ In other words, the nuclear concern was to be addressed first, followed by the other issues — through the conclusion of JCPOA 2, and so on. Joe Biden’s administration lacked a clear and consistent policy on Iran. Now, in his new presidential term, Donald Trump has gone beyond his previous goals. It is now about a regional order with Israeli hegemony. In other words, there is a belief in the US that the guarantor of American interests in the region is Israeli supremacy. This belief comes either from Trump himself or from Netanyahu. And when Trump now says he wants a comprehensive agreement with Iran, it means this: either Iran will officially recognize the existence of Israel, or it will be weakened to the point where it can no longer play any role in the region.   

Either Trump thinks so, or Netanyahu has convinced him that full US intervention is not necessary. All it takes is political support, economic pressure and occasional military intervention. According to them, what has already been done, namely pinpoint strikes, is enough for Israel to establish its dominance. 

If viewed from this perspective, the war between Iran and Israel was inevitable. It had nothing to do with the negotiations. The negotiations served as a basis for Iran to come to terms with it. There was a perception in the US and Israel that Iran was irreversibly weakened, and it was true: it was regionally weakened. Iran either had to accept the new order through negotiations or be forced to accept it through war. Trump has said both before and after the war that Iran must surrender. In my opinion, the war was an extension of US diplomacy, not a contradictory process. 

-We continue to hear opposing approaches from both sides concerning the negotiations. As you mentioned, Trump states that Iran must surrender and accept his demands, while Tehran states it must respect its right to enrich uranium and guarantee that military force will not be used against Iran again during negotiations. Under these circumstances, is it likely that Iran will reenter negotiations? 

- Iran is currently in a difficult situation, in terms of the damage it has suffered in the region, as well as from military and nuclear perspectives.  While Iran believes that this damage can be repaired, in a situation where it no longer controls its airspace and its air defenses have been destroyed, any step to rebuild its nuclear capability will inevitably meet with a response from the other side.   

Iran faces a dilemma in this situation. On the one hand, it distrusts the negotiation process:  according to the Iranian side, the US and Israel used the talks as a cover to carry out their attacks. But on the other hand, rebuilding both nuclear and military capabilities is a time-consuming process. 

Thus, whether Iran is involved in the negotiations tactically or strategically, it is certainly a necessity today. 

Iran believes it is necessary to engage in the negotiation process while demonstrating that Iran is not as weak as the US and Israel would like to believe. From their point of view, recent events have proved just that. And Iran has indeed been able to strike hard. Iran expects that by going to negotiations, either the opposing side will recognize that achieving objectives against Iran by military means is impossible and will be forced to accept some of Iran’s demands and red lines (e.g. the right to enrich uranium), or Iran will at least buy time to rebuild.   

 -When examining the content of Israel’s strikes during the war, it becomes evident that the targets were not only nuclear facilities, but also military bases, missile sites and even economic infrastructure. Moreover, these strikes have been accompanied by regular appeals to Iranian society that this is a unique opportunity for regime change. Given the multifaceted nature of Israel’s actions, what were the country’s main objectives during the 12-day war? Did Israel achieve these objectives?   

-I think we can distinguish between minimum and maximum goals here. The minimum goals have been achieved: the development of Iran’s nuclear program has been delayed and military capabilities have been significantly damaged. A higher goal would be, for example, the complete destruction of Iran’s nuclear capability by US strikes. But for Israel, this is a temporary situation. 

As long as there is an Islamic Republic with its ideology that does not officially recognize Israel and speaks of its destruction, whether it is rhetoric or strategy, it is a constant threat to Israel. This threat will only disappear when this system ceases to exist.

However, I believe Israel’s goals extend beyond that. Netanyahu has repeatedly stated his goal of altering the regional order. And the order will change only when other powers, either willingly or by force, accept this new order and there are no more forces left in the region to challenge it. In this sense, Iran, as a united and strong state, is a threat to Israel. 

-Whether it be the Islamic Republic or another regime? 

- Yes. If we look at history, we see that many things that the Islamic Republic is doing today were done by the Shah in the past. Iran’s nuclear program began during the Shah’s reign. There are also examples of regional participation. Just as the Islamic Republic has played a role in Syria, the Shah has played a similar role in Oman. In Lebanon, the Islamic Republic supported Hezbollah and the Shah supported Amal. Even the military program: the Shah had ambitions to become a hegemon in the region. So, if we exclude ideology, we are dealing with geopolitical logic. Iran’s geopolitical location and resources naturally place it as a key player in the region. This is something that the other powers cannot agree on. This is a threat to Iran’s regional rivals: Turkey, Saudi Arabia and others. That’s why a weakened Islamic Republic is sufficient for them, as they are immediate neighbors and instability in Iran could quickly affect them. Therefore, a more acceptable option for them is Iran, which is under sanctions and constrained economically and militarily, and will not be able to challenge them. But this is not enough for Israel. While Turkey and Saudi Arabia have geopolitical depth, Israel does not have this advantage. Its influence is based on technological and military capabilities. And that is precisely why, from Israel’s point of view, Iran, as a state with such a geopolitical location and such resources, regardless of which regime rules there, will have a natural desire to rebuild itself and become a hegemonic power in the future. Israel is striving to prevent this. This is its ultimate goal. This concern has also been expressed in Iran, where Israel’s goal is not simply regime change, but the destruction of Iran as a nation state. That’s why many Iranians, despite their dislike of the Islamic Republic, strongly opposed external attacks during the war. This is where the patriotism of the Iranians, which united them, came to the fore. 

- Do you agree with the Iranian authorities’ assessment that during the war, the Iranian people, even the internal and external opposition, demonstrated national unity and solidarity?

-I agree, all of this proves it. Only one wing of the external opposition directly supported Israel: Reza Pahlavi. Others, criticizing the Islamic Republic for dragging the country into war, didn’t support Israel’s actions. Even Mostafa Tajzadeh, a prominent opposition figure in Iran, condemned Israel’s actions while in prison. There is a consensus among Iranians that everyone is in the same boat, and if that boat is damaged, everyone will drown together. In other words, conflicts with the Islamic Republic continue, but this does not mean that Iranians support Israel’s actions. 

- Will this unity remain stable in the near future, or is the opposite process expected: public discontent, demonstrations? Are there any noticeable signs of this?  

-Historically, the people of Iran have united under external pressure. But until the root causes of the problem are addressed, it is difficult to say whether this unity will be long-lasting. Economic problems persist and sanctions may be tightened. Political and social discontent continues. That is why critics of the regime within the country are calling for this opportunity to be seized, for political prisoners to be released and for the social climate to be improved. Otherwise, the cycle may repeat itself. 

-At the same time, we are seeing the Iranian parliament discussing a law after the war that will toughen penalties for cooperation with Israel and other countries. The same bill establishes penalties for “violating the moral and psychological peace of society” and spreading knowingly false information. Does this mean that control is being tightened, rather than loosened? 

-At present, the Constitutional Guard Council has returned the bill with reservations and has not yet approved it. But control, naturally, has intensified. There were many arrests during the war. If this law had been passed just like that, it would already be systemic. Thus, it is crucial that if such laws are adopted in the near future, the situation will become even more complicated. Anyway, it is worth noting that there are also some disagreements within the system. Under conditions of corruption and internal competition, certain circles are attempting to evade responsibility. For instance, the issue of the mass deportation of Afghans. In some cases, there may have been involvement in sabotage or espionage. But when it comes to eliminating the country’s top leadership and nuclear scientists, it is clear that the problem lies in systemic infiltration. And now, to avoid exposure and accountability, these people within the system are placing all the blame on the Afghans. This indicates a lack of unity within the ruling elite in understanding the root causes of the problems and how to solve them. Until such a will is formed, it is difficult to expect serious changes.   

-If we look at Israel’s retaliatory strikes against Iran, it becomes clear that Iran’s strikes were insufficient, but they did not remain without consequences. Overall, did Iran set itself the task of responding adequately? What was Iran’s main goal in this war?  

-Iran’s entire military doctrine is based on the principle of “deterrence through punishment.” Iran’s goal was to show that any attack on it would be met with a harsh response. This war aimed to contain Israel, not to defeat it. Iran’s goal was to stop the war. And despite the losses incurred and the limited scope for response, Iran was able to achieve its first goal: to end the war. Of course, if it weren’t for Iran’s missile capabilities, Israel would have gone that far and achieved its ultimate goal. But there is no guarantee that Iran will be able to achieve its second goal: restoring deterrence.  

-After all these events, including the 12-day war, the situation in Gaza, the weakening of Hezbollah and the loss of Syria as an ally, does Iran have a chance to regain its former position in the region? 

-In the short term, it is impossible. In the medium and long term, this is linked to both internal and external factors. I do not believe that Iran will be able to restore the influence it had in 2014-2024 in the foreseeable future. Therefore, I believe that shortly, regional confrontation will mainly unfold between Turkey and Israel.  

-Let’s also consider Russia’s role. Former Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif repeatedly stated in interviews after leaving office that normalizing relations between Iran and the West was not in Russia’s interests and that Moscow had even tried to obstruct the nuclear negotiations. What role is Russia playing in the current crisis, given that Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi visited Russia during the war? What does Iran expect from Moscow?    

-During this war, the perception of Russia by Iran’s ruling elite was extremely negative. Iran’s calculation and especially that of the IRGC was that by supporting Russia in the war in Ukraine, Iran would become its main partner and strengthen its position in the international arena. When the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement with Russia was signed, there were no high expectations either and naturally, Iran did not expect that Russia, by supporting Iran, would be drawn into a war against Israel. But the position taken by Russia and Putin personally proved to be painful for Iran and the Iranian people. Russia didn’t directly condemn Israel and didn’t express full support for Iran. Even though Iran has been supplying drones over the years, Russia has done nothing to strengthen Iran’s Air Force. Currently, Iran has adopted the view that Russia is not a reliable partner in matters of military security. Iran begins to focus more on China. Of course, it is still unclear how successful this will be, but they are now moving closer to China and Russia is seen as a country that is using this opportunity to promote its interests. Since this is also an opportunity for Russia: like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Russia wants Iran to be weak, stable, but weak without nuclear weapons and at the same time with anti-Western ideology. 

-Armenia followed the 12-day war very closely, as Iran is one of Armenia’s important economic and political partners, and any developments in or around that country can have a direct impact on Armenia. Iran is also one of the key players openly opposing the so-called ‘Zangezur Corridor’. Could war and further escalation of the situation around Iran lead to a change in Tehran’s position? Is Iran ready and able, despite internal and external challenges, to continue to consistently promote its approach to this issue?

-Following the Karabakh war, when it became clear that Azerbaijan, Turkey and Russia had common interests in this corridor, Iran’s attention to the South Caucasus increased. Iran has begun to view the security and territorial integrity of Armenia as a matter of its own security. However, Iran has always preferred to resolve this issue through diplomatic channels. Iran’s approach to Azerbaijan is a combination of deterrence and containment: red lines have been drawn, diplomatic efforts have been made, and joint military exercises have been conducted to reduce the potential threat from the enemy. But the problem is that this danger really exists, and Iran fears that Azerbaijan may take advantage of Iran’s current weakness to resolve the issue by military means. I think that President Pezeshkian’s recent visit to Azerbaijan, which was widely criticized in Iran, was the result of a realistic approach to Iran’s limited capabilities. Iran is trying to restrain Azerbaijan through cooperation, both directly through diplomatic ties and indirectly through Turkey.

Overall, there are various approaches to policy towards Azerbaijan in Iran. Some consider this policy too mild, especially in light of unconfirmed reports that Azerbaijani territory was also used against Iran. There are people in Iran, who believe that Tehran should give a decisive response to Azerbaijan to limit cooperation with Israel and prevent possible actions on the corridor issue. But there is the Turkey factor here. Iran’s main concern is not Azerbaijan, but Turkey itself as a major regional power. Iran needs Turkey now. Therefore, I believe that Iran is trying to control the situation diplomatically, supporting the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey while continuing its diplomatic efforts. Iran’s attention is now focused on preserving its territorial integrity, and any actions outside the country carry additional risks.