The number of people killed during protests in Iran over the past two weeks is counted in the hundreds and thousands, depending on the source of information. These numbers are also unclear due to the widespread internet shutdown, which has been continuing for 6 days.   

The mass wave of protests in Iran started on December 28, 2025. Since January 8, the Iranian authorities have shut down the Internet, and as of January 14, not much information about the situation in the country is available. 

This wave of protests should not be viewed as a separate event. It is the continuation of the protest movements that have emerged in Iran over the past decade. 

The key feature of these protests is that, alongside the deterioration of the economic situation and the increase in public discontent, each successive wave becomes more intensive than the previous one. Moreover, this is also fueled by the disappointment that followed the previous wave, unfulfilled promises, and the deepening crisis of trust in the authorities. 

The context of previous protests

Motivation for various protests in recent years (not just a reason, but especially a motive), have been water scarcity, electricity shortages, pensions and various social and economic issues. However, they were local and limited, and didn’t turn into nationwide and long-lasting actions.   

Over the last 10 years, there have also been major protests in Iran, including:

• Protests between December 2017 and January 2018, caused by rising egg prices,
• Protests in November 2019, caused by rising petrol prices, 
• Protests in September-November 2022, the motive of which was the death of Masha Amini, who was detained on charges of “improperly wearing” a headscarf. However, the deeper cause was the general discontent with the mandatory wearing of a headscarf and the Islamic state system as a whole.   

The protests of 2022 were a turning point: they were unprecedented in their duration, about three months, as well as their scale, motives, and agenda. The number of victims of these protests reached about 500 people. 

That wave had such a serious impact that even the Iranian elite began to talk about the need for systemic changes. Options for transforming the model of governance were discussed in the media: transforming from a presidential to a prime ministerial system, revising the role of individual institutions.  

However, that discussion remained only at the level of discussions and press, and didn’t develop into clear political decisions and reforms. In fact, the only change that can be noted after the 2022 protests was the relative easing of controls on headscarf wearing. However, even this easing didn’t have a complete and stable character. Later, the Iranian parliament initiated a bill to toughen penalties for not wearing a headscarf, the implementation of which was only temporarily suspended through the efforts of Masoud Pezeshkian’s government. However, the issue of enforcing the ban on the headscarf remained relevant thereafter, provoking the dissatisfaction of various institutions.   

The devaluation of the rial as a catalyst for a deep crisis 

The immediate trigger for the current protests was the sharp devaluation of the Iranian rial, when at the end of December, the exchange rate was 1,420,000 rial per dollar, and by January 6, it reached 1,470,000. This sparked the next wave of protests. 

The devaluation of the rial has a long history and reflects the fundamental problems of the Iranian economy: the impact of sanctions, the closed nature of the investment environment, corruption, monopolies, and so on.  Under these circumstances, the latest currency collapse was not only an economic blow to broad sections of society but also a symbol of the government’s inability to run the country. 

High inflation is also a fundamental problem in Iran. In 2025 alone, the prices of goods in the country rose by 1.5 times. The chart below shows that, compared to Armenia, goods in Iran are rising by several tens of percent annually. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund’s estimates confirm this. The year with the lowest inflation for Iran was 2016. It was then that international sanctions against Iran were lifted after the signing of the nuclear deal (the deal was later revoked during Donald Trump’s first term as president). 

Parallel political crisis 

Previously, society actively participated in elections, hoping to influence the country’s development through presidential and parliamentary elections, and was even prepared to take to the streets to defend its vote, as it did in 2009. However, in recent years, this belief has collapsed. Two factors significantly contributed to this: 

1. The failure of the Nuclear deal and President Hassan Rouhani’s broken promises,
2. Against this backdrop, the strengthening of the conservative wing’s positions and the exclusion of any alternative to the conservatives in the political arena.

In 2020, 2021, and 2024, parliamentary and presidential elections were held predominantly with conservative candidates; reformist and moderate candidates were simply not approved. Amid disappointment and a lack of alternatives, the public showed no interest in participating in the elections, and record-low voter turnout was recorded each time.  

However, the 2024 presidential election was accompanied by an interesting turn of events: the first round of elections saw a record-low turnout of 39.93%, but in the second round, when the choice was between reformist Pezeshkian and ultra-conservative Saeed Jalili, the public once again showed interest in participating in the election (49.68%). As a result, Pezeshkian won, promising a series of reforms on issues of utmost importance to society, including the issue of wearing headscarves, the Internet, etc. However, no major changes happened. Given these circumstances, a significant portion of the population has become convinced that the problem lies not with individual branches of government or specific representatives, but with the entire system. 

War as a “missed opportunity” 

The Iran-Israel war in June 2025 could unite society around the government. At least, the government saw that opportunity. During the war, the Iranian society didn’t respond to external calls to take to the streets, which the authorities interpreted as a demonstration of loyalty and unity around them. 

This was seen as a historic opportunity to implement real changes and to build or restore public trust. But these changes were perceived differently by different camps. 

Major state institutions and conservative circles emphasized the need to improve the economic situation of the people. Reformist circles put forward clear proposals: the release of political prisoners, the lifting of internet restrictions, reform of decision-making mechanisms, reform of institutions that restrict political competition, particularly the reform of the Guardian Council, and a definite step back in negotiations with the United States. However, none of the proposals were implemented, and the Reform Front was criticized for such proposals. As a result, after the war, the country faced new problems, and the “gratitude of the authorities to the people” remained at the level of rhetoric.  

The specifics of the new protests

The current wave of protest is distinguished by several important features. First, they take place against the backdrop of Iran’s weakening position in the region, specifically: 

• Hamas weakened after the war in Gaza, and the movement’s leader, Ismail Haniyeh, was killed in Tehran. 
• Hezbollah, one of Iran’s main allies in the region, has also been significantly weakened as a result of Israel’s actions.
• Tehran also lost its main ally, Syria, as a result of the change of power in that country. 
• Against the backdrop of all this, Iran was drawn into direct war, which resulted in significant losses and limitations on its nuclear capabilities and, likely, its ambitions.  

New protests are also distinguished by their volume: in a short time, they covered almost every state, including small, medium and large cities, as well as the largest religious cities, which were previously considered relatively loyal territories. 

The participation of the bazaar (as a social stratum) is particularly indicative. Historically, the bazaar was considered one of the social pillars of the system, and its participation in the demonstrations testifies to a real crisis of confidence. This is also an indicator that public discontent in Iran spans a wide range of social layers, with the middle class also taking part in the protests.  

This wave of protests is also notable for its intensity. Since January 6, it gradually reached its peak, surpassing all previous years' protests. The Iranian authorities responded by shutting down the internet and intensifying repression, resulting in hundreds of casualties among demonstrators and law enforcement officers. 

The protests were also accompanied by riots. Iranian authorities attribute the violent actions to “terrorists” and “infiltrators”.  Moreover, this hypothesis may be most justified, especially in the western regions of the country, which were previously known for the activity of armed groups.    

However, violent acts occurred in various cities across the country, including the capital Tehran, the main religious city of Mashhad, and other major cities such as Isfahan, Rasht, etc. Therefore, this also testifies to the significant level of hatred that has accumulated against the system. 

Candidates’ struggle

Another feature of protests is the issue of leadership. From the very beginning of the current protests, Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last shah, who lives in the United States, has been active and has tried to position himself as a leader. He appealed to the protesters to continue their actions. As a result, an agenda was formed in the propaganda field, that the protesters demanded “the return of the Shah”. The slogans “death to Khamenei” and “The Shah will return”, which are the most frequently heard at the protests, also spoke in favor of that agenda. 

Pahlavi himself regularly makes calls and pushes the Iranian people to fight, to remove the Islamic elite, also expressing his willingness to return to Iran. However, with almost all the connections muted in Iran, it is difficult to say how far his appeals are reaching the people of Iran right now. 

Reza Pahlavi, who has never been in power in Iran, is now perhaps closer to that possibility than ever before. He promises to form a temporary government to unite all constructive forces for the discussion of the future “in one tent”. With this aim, he regularly appeals to Trump to intervene and overthrow Iran’s Islamic regime. 

It should be emphasized that Pahlavi has no independent power. He stated that he recruited 50 thousand volunteers, including within the current authorities. However, his leadership is currently more coordinating than leading. When the Internet connection hadn’t yet been disconnected, he specified a specific time of day for the protests to begin, which played a coordinating rather than a leading role. On the other hand, it is also impossible to assess the effect of his calls for protests.      

However, it should also be noted that there is no unified opposition in Iran: neither inside nor outside the country. Reza Pahlavi has received the most attention at the moment, but even there, a large number of opposition figures reject his participation in the construction of a new state in post-Islamic Iran. Yet, attitudes toward him are not unanimous even within Iran. Either way, “the return of the shah” requires clear external support and intervention, and an indication of such support could be Pahlavi’s secret meeting with the US President’s Special Envoy for the Middle East, Steve Whitcoff.  

Western circles discuss the Venezuelan version, and the Iranian localization of it can be as follows: the spiritual leader leaves or is removed, the ruling elite establishes a new state order, and begins to cooperate with the West. 

The factor of external pressures 

These Iranian protests are also special from the viewpoint of the West’s reaction. In the case of previous demonstrations, there have always been statements supporting the protesters from the USA, Israel, and European countries. The maximum actions taken against Iran were to impose sanctions on charges of human rights violations.  

However, this time, direct threats to strike have also intensified. Since the beginning of the protests, U.S. President Donald Trump has promised “tough strikes”. According to US media reports, this also includes military strikes, and Trump has been presented with options for military action against Iran.  

At the same time, the U.S. President announced that any country trading with Iran would pay a tariff of 25%  to the US. This means that the United States is at least trying to deepen Iran’s isolation and put additional pressure on the socio-economic situation, stimulating the likelihood of new waves of protests and making it more difficult for the system to manage the situation.   

This means that American threats may imply not only military action, but also further compression on economic and political circles, which can cause new, more serious shocks to the Iranian state system. 

The authority’s response and the strengthening role of the IRGC

Meanwhile, the reaction of the present Iranian authorities to the internal crisis is repeating a familiar scenario. First, soft rhetoric and calls for dialogue, then declaring protesters “rebels” and “terrorists”, the Internet shutdown and complete control of the information field.   

It is noteworthy that at the beginning of the protests, the government’s rhetoric was particularly mild, trying to create a constructive atmosphere and control the situation. However, after the protests intensified and the Internet was shut down, the authorities’ rhetoric became harsher.  

On the one hand, the authorities, not only the government but also spiritual leader, and other figures recognize the existence of economic problems and legitimate complaints due to it. On the other hand, the growing discontent and political component of the protests are fully attributed to the external enemy.  

It is extremely telling that following restrictions on the Internet and other means of communication, the only resources currently available are those associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC was just created to protect the Islamic system, and currently performs that role. 

This shows that if the Iranian government overcomes this crisis, the IRGC's position may become even stronger. And the strengthening of the IRGC means the strengthening of conservatism. In practice, that means that the possibility for systemic political reforms will become even narrower. 

Conclusion

In recent years, a clear pattern has emerged in Iran: each wave of protests is suppressed without addressing its root causes, which leads to the next wave becoming stronger, larger and more extremist. As a result, the current system appeared in a closed loop, where the need for change is generally recognized but red lines are drawn for these changes cannot be crossed, and consequently, the system is neither willing nor able to make significant concessions. 

Furthermore, the political views of various institutions within the state system on the nature and depth of change also vary considerably. And the government’s attempts to combat monopolies and corruption in the economic sphere often face not only sanctions but also systemic barriers. 

One of the reasons is that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has an active and deep involvement in Iran’s economy. The latter was created to protect the Islamic system, and this circumstance makes any serious pressure or restrictions practically unrealistic. Previous reformist governments that sought to limit the IRGC’s economic activities were unable to achieve that goal. 

Another problem is the government’s subsidy policy, which has run its course and become an additional burden on the budget. However, the system cannot completely eliminate subsidies, because that also causes shocks in society, as happened with the rise in petrol prices. As a result, the authorities introduce new subsidies and put more pressure on the budget.  

The experience from previous crisis shows that the state system often resorts to cosmetic changes and responds to pressure directed against it with even greater pressure. Most likely, this time too, they may be “tough” but in reality, cosmetic solutions. Some officials may become scapegoats to simulate a solution to the problem. Such trends already exist now. However, this approach is mainly limited to the economic sphere, while the discontent of the Iranian society has long gone beyond socio-economic problems and has a broader, political and systemic nature.  

If profound reforms are not implemented at this stage, then the next, even small, socio-economic or political trigger could lead to a new, more organized, and more dangerous crisis. 

Most likely, the system will respond to the next challenge by increasing pressure until it clashes with a more organized and large-scale wave that it will either be unable to fully control, or cracks will appear within the system. But one of the main questions will also be whether the likely deep reforms will bridge the gap between the broad masses of society and the system. It does not seem that way now. 

The other important question is the nature of the scenarios for possible direct external interventions. Each scenario could create an entirely new situation in Iran.