The Ukrainian crisis and the resulting tensions in Eastern Europe have triggered processes within the European Union’s official and public agendas concerning the militarization of Europe and the transformation of security issues in the post-Soviet period. Since the 1990s, European society has continuously evolved within the framework of the paradigm of “post-historical pacifism”, the welfare state and the “peace dividends”[1], however, current geopolitical processes in Europe have made it necessary to reevaluate the foundations of its security.  

Perceptions of the war in Ukraine as a treat to EU Security 

Standard Eurobarometer 105 / Spring 2026 indicate that the prolonged nature of the war in Ukraine has led the public to perceive the conflict as more than just a local war. This is evidenced by the fact that:

• 76% of respondents in 27 European countries view Russia’s military actions in Ukraine as a direct threat to the security of the European Union (QD3.1) [2], 
• while 70% view it as a threat to their own country’s national security (QD3.2).
• 76% of respondents believe that the EU should support Ukraine until a just and lasting peace is achieved (QD3.3).

• 80% of the EU population supports greater defense cooperation at the EU level (QD3.4), which is consistent with the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy [3], under which defense matters in individual EU countries are to be transferred to the higher EU level, in Brussels.  

This situation shows that the perception of external threats has become an integral part of the pan-European political identity. 

As a result, issues previously discussed within the EU in the context of highly specialized military programs, in particular, joint arms procurement, direct funding from the EU budget for military equipment deliveries to third countries and the expansion of the production capacities of the EU’s defense-industrial complexes and those of individual member states are now being openly discussed in the media. 

Public opinion in the EU on support for Ukraine

Eurobarometer data show that Europeans’ attitudes toward support for Ukraine vary significantly depending on the nature of the support. The most positive attitudes are observed regarding humanitarian and financial aid, as well as sanctions policy toward Russia, however, these attitudes are significantly less pronounced when it comes to military-technical support and steps toward Ukraine’s integration into Europe (Figure 1).  

Figure 1. Public Opinion in Europe on the EU’s response to the conflict in Ukraine

Source: Eurobarometer_Standard_STD105_data_annex_en.pd։ The numbers in parentheses indicate the corresponding questions in the survey questionnaire that relate to this form of support.

Data presented in Figure 1 shows a significant gap, ranging from 18-23%, between, on the one hand, socioeconomic solidarity with Ukraine (providing financial and humanitarian aid, accepting refugees from the conflict zone) and, on the other hand, military and integration support for Ukraine (funding arms deliveries, granting EU candidate status). Although the overwhelming majority of the population, 75%, supports providing financial and humanitarian aid, 56% favor direct arms deliveries. 

Moreover, about 40% of Europeans openly oppose financing the purchase of military equipment for Ukraine, which indicates the existence of a persistent anti-war or, in other words, “cautious” segment of EU society that seeks to avoid an escalation in relations with Russia, a nuclear power, and the threat of a potential confrontation. 

“Paying for security” vs “Personally participating in the defense of one’s own country” 

Alongside a seemingly unified stance on issues of pan-European solidarity and militarization, a unique sociological phenomenon exists within the EU. Empirical data show a gap within European society on security issues: on the one hand, the EU public supports increased funding for the European Union’s defense sector (and is willing to pay for its own security), but on the other hand, there is little willingness to participate directly and personally in the country’s defense in the event of war. Figure 2 shows the residents’ attitudes in EU regions toward the two areas mentioned.  

Figure 2. Support for increasing the EU’s military budget and willingness to personally defend one’s country with arms, EU regions, 2026. 

The EU population is much more likely to support an increase in the European Union’s military budget (65%) than to be willing to personally defend their country or homeland in the event of war (41%). The gap is 24%. The overall picture is the same across EU regions: people are more willing to pay for security than to participate in their country’s defense personally. However, the indicators for these positions vary significantly across different regions of the EU. 

• They are most willing both to defend their country with arms (54%) and to pay for security in Northern Europe and the Baltic region (70%).
• When it comes to personal involvement in national defense, Western European countries stand out: here, this figure is the lowest, 33%. However, they are almost equally willing to pay for security (67%).
• The lowest willingness to pay for security is in Eastern and Central European countries,  59%. The willingness to personally participate in the defense is also low here, 38%.  
• The figures for Southern Europe are close to the EU averages, 63% and 41%, respectively.  

Overall, the closer an EU region is to an active combat zone, the greater, all else being equal, the willingness to both pay for security and personally participate in the country’s defense.  

Figure 3 provides a more detailed overview of the issues under consideration; it shows 2 relevant indicators for the 27 EU member states.

Figure 3. Support for increasing EU defense spending and the personal willingness of citizens in the 27 EU countries to take up arms to defend their countries. The countries are listed using the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 international codes.  

Sources: Standard Eurobarometer 105 - Spring 2026, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3613։  Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) — RSU NATO Poll., Gallup International — Willingness to Fight Survey.

The figure shows that the willingness to personally defend one’s country with arms is highest in the countries of Northern Europe, such as Sweden (SE, 66%), Finland (FI, 64%), and Denmark (DK, 60%), as well as in the Baltic states, particularly in Lithuania (LT, 52%), and in countries located in the proximity to the combat zone, such as Romania (RO, 50%) and Poland (PL, 49%).

These are countries that have retained a system of universal military conscription (Finland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia and Poland). Furthermore, a culture of civic engagement has taken root in these countries, and the key factors contributing to its development are: 

• • Geographical location and historical experience. For example, Finland, Estonia and Poland share a long border with the Russian Federation and have a history of, or a precedent for the loss of independence. The people of these countries view Russia as an existential threat to themselves. 
  • “Total defense” concept. Over the course of decades, a political culture has developed in Sweden, Finland and Estonia in which national defense is considered the responsibility not only of a professional army, but also of society as a whole and of each individual. In these countries, there is a widespread belief that universal military conscription for men is an honorable civic duty and an element of national identity. 
• Trust in Government institutions. Furthermore, in Finland, Sweden and Estonia this perception is accompanied by a high level of trust in government institutions, particularly the courts.  

In Greece (63%), which is geographically located in Southern Europe, there is also a high percentage of people who are willing to defend their country with weapons personally. This is likely due to the ongoing and periodically escalating tensions between Greece and Turkey, tensions that could escalate into a military conflict (as was the case during the crises over Cyprus in 1963-1964 and 1974, disputes over oil drilling rights in the Aegean Sea in 1976 and 1987, as well as the 1966 crisis over the sovereignty of the Imia islets). 

The lowest levels of willingness to personally participate in a defensive war for one’s country are observed in Croatia (HR, 24%), Slovakia (SK, 25%), Belgium (BE, 25%), the Netherlands (NL, 30%), the Czech Republic (33%), and Hungary (33%). It is worth noting that:

• The willingness to personally defend one’s country is very low in leading European countries, such as Germany (27%), Italy (25%), and France (30%). 

In Germany, France and Italy, the low level of mobilization culture, one manifestation of which is the attitude toward defending one’s country by taking up arms, is shaped by cultural characteristics that have developed over the decades following World War II and the Cold War. In particular:

• People were used to the idea that receiving “Peace dividends” was the social norm. Security was taken for granted, since these countries were under NATO’s “umbrella” and were far removed from areas of potential conflict. This undermined the motivation to defend one’s homeland personally. 
• The transition to a professional army. Compulsory military service was abolished in Germany in 2011, in France in 1997 and in Italy in 2005. Military service has evolved into specialized contract work. The army is viewed as a “state within a state”; it has no connection to the daily lives of the population. As a result, the direct link between society and the defense field has been broken. 
• In the developed countries of Western Europe, values such as personal safety, comfort, and social well-being prevail. They view personal participation in combat operations as a “relic of the past” that does not meet modern standards of quality of life, since this role has been handed over to professional soldiers.  
• Since World War II, a strong anti-militarist political culture has formed in Germany, centered around the slogan “Never Again”. Concepts such as patriotism, military service, and national power had long carried negative connotations here, while pacifism, diplomacy, and economic integration became the priorities of foreign policy.  

However, it should be noted that Germany is currently preparing to gradually return to a model of universal conscription – a move driven by several factors.

• Radical transformation of the security architecture in Europe. In Germany, there is a widespread belief that economic power and diplomacy no longer directly guarantee security, and that the potential threat of military conflict has become a reality. 
• The German army faced an acute shortage of personnel and mobilization resources. The number of contract service members and the personnel reserve are insufficient to meet obligations to NATO. 
• The previous military doctrine “the army is meant for overseas missions” has been replaced by a new one: “the army is meant to defend the territories.” The army needs a steady influx of servicemen and a strong mobilization reserve. 
• Since a direct return to the previous conscription system faces domestic political resistance and discontent among youth, Germany has adopted a compromise approach to military recruitment: data on the health and fitness for service of all citizens reaching the age of 18 is collected electronically; measures are being developed to encourage military service; and there are plans to introduce a lottery-based draft system in the future. 

The situation described implies that if the status quo persists, the European Union, in the event of a direct, high-intensity conventional conflict, will either remain critically dependent on the U.S. nuclear and military “umbrella,” or will be forced to prepare for combat operations based exclusively on technologies and capabilities for long-range strikes.

Conclusions

EU-Russia relations

The sociological trends reflected in the Eurobarometer indicate that the confrontation between the European Union and Russia is a long-term and persistent process. The EU’s information policy has led 78% of the EU population to believe that Russia is a systemic source of threats to the EU. Under the current circumstances, the classic “security dilemma” effect [4] is at play, aggravated by a sociological gap within society: 

1. Elites and the general public in EU countries view increased military spending, joint arms procurement, and the integration of European countries’ defense-industrial complexes as necessary defensive measures that, in their view, serve to deter military escalation. 
2. Russia views the substantial strengthening of the EU’s military infrastructure and the militarization of public discourse as coordinated preparations by NATO and the EU for a prolonged conflict involving the use of force. 

These positions reinforce one another through a cycle of positive feedback, block the path to diplomatic dialogue, and lead to an uncontrolled arms race.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that: 

1. Against the backdrop of Brussel’s hardline stance which enjoys public support (73% of EU residents support sanctions against Russia and 63% support military aid to Ukraine)  a political deadlock has emerged, making any attempt by an EU government to reach a compromise with Russia politically risky, European politicians who propose resuming dialogue with Moscow face accusations of “capitulation,”  and this situation only fuels the rhetoric of escalation. 

The South Caucasus and Armenia 

For the countries of the South Caucasus and particularly for Armenia, the confrontation between the EU and Russia creates a complex set of geopolitical risks and opportunities, which are presented below in a generalized and schematic form.  

1. 73% of the EU population supports strict controls on the re-export of European goods to Russia and the imposition of sanctions for violations.

As a result, strict EU oversight of re-exports could pose a direct risk of secondary sanctions being imposed on Armenia’s banking, financial and logistics system.

1. The presence of non-regional players could turn the South Caucasus into an arena of rivalry.
2. Regional actors view the EU’s integration initiatives and missions in the South Caucasus as tools for expanding European influence, which could provoke a negative reaction.  
3. Given the sociological paradox that has emerged (the EU is willing to provide military-technical and financial support but is categorically unwilling to engage in direct military intervention to defend third countries), Armenia cannot rely on military security guarantees from the EU. It is preferable to strengthen one’s own defense capabilities and combine this with the development of military and diplomatic cooperation with the West and traditional regional partners. 

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[1] “Peace dividend”: the additional economic and social benefits that Europe has reaped since the end of the Cold War, beginning in the 1990s. As a result of the easing of military tensions and the threat of global war, European countries were able to significantly reduce military spending and the size of their armed forces, redirecting the substantial funds thus freed up toward the development of social services, healthcare, and infrastructure, as well as directly toward improving the standard of living of their population.  

Actually, this process has already ended in Europe. European countries are forced to allocate financial resources to the defense industry. 

[2] See all sources of the research data: Standard Eurobarometer 105 - Spring 2026, https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/3613. Throughout the text, question codes corresponding to specific concepts in the research questionnaire are provided in parentheses.  

[3] The EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is the mechanism through which the European Union implements its foreign policy at the supranational level, including the conduct of civilian and military operations outside the EU’s borders. 

[4] The security dilemma is a situation in which a state’s actions aimed at strengthening its own security (such as increasing military spending or tightening border security) are perceived by neighboring countries as a threat to their own security. In response, the neighboring state takes measures to strengthen its security. This creates a closed loop, or more precisely, an escalation fueled by positive feedback, which increases the risk that a potential conflict will escalate into an actual one.