The article was written by Narek Davtyan, a second-year master’s student in National Security at the Faculty of Political Science of the Russian-Armenian University, as part of his internship. 

Internship supervisor: Hasmik Meliksetyan 

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New regional realities

The Georgian transport system is a key link in the Caspian-Black Sea corridor, which serves as a transit route for cargo shipments from Asia to Europe. The country’s ports, railways and highways form an extensive logistics network that not only meets domestic needs but also integrates Georgia into international transport corridors. Analysis of individual elements of this system provides insights into how the country is realizing its strategic transit and economic opportunities.

Georgia has two main ports, Poti and Batumi, and two specialized terminals, Kulevi and Supsa. These ports are the main transit hubs for the transport of goods from Turkey, the Middle East, and Europe to Central Asia and Afghanistan. Main routes: Azerbaijan and Russia via the Samur/Yalama border crossing, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan via the Alyat (Baku)-Turkmenbashi ferry crossing, and Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan via the Alyat (Baku)- Aktau/Kurik ferry crossing. Future plans include the construction and commissioning of the deep-water port of Anaklia.   

Port of Poti

The Port of Poti has historically been Georgia’s main container hub, integrated with rail and transit corridors from the Caspian region to Europe. Since 2011, it has belonged to APM Terminals. This port is the European gateway to international trade with Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and is of key importance to the countries of Central Asia. It provides ferry service to Romania and is connected to the Georgian railway network. Poti is capable of handling large container flows, which enhances its role as a strategically important international transit hub. However, Poti has limitations in terms of throughput capacity and territory expansion, which hinder the further development of container lines. In 2025, Poti reached its historic high in container traffic, handling 636,466 containers. This is 17% more than in 2024 (545,297  containers). In addition to receiving containers, the port can also handle dry cargo, including up to 500,000 tons of wheat. However, 243,048 tons of wheat passed through the port in 2025. In 2024, the operator of the Port of Poti reported that with appropriate funding (approximately $200 million), it would be possible to modernize the port, after which it would be able to handle more than 1 million containers per year.  Dr. Paata Tsagareishvili, the head of the Transport Corridor Research Center and a transport expert, noted in an interview with Interpressnews.ge in January 2026 that Poti has required investment since 2018, and this issue still has not been resolved between the state and the port. “The port aims to boost its throughput capacity using internal reserves to handle 650,000 containers by 2026,” the expert said.  

Despite existing problems, Poti handles about 80% of Georgia’s container cargo and is a key hub in the Georgian transit corridor. 

The main problem with the Port of Poti is the water depth: the working depth of the berth is 8-11 meters, which prevents it from accepting large-capacity vessels. 

The second problem is limited space for expansion and modernization. The Port of Poti developed gradually within an already established urban and industrial environment, which hinders its further expansion. The efficiency of the port is determined by the state of the entire logistics chain, primarily the railway and customs systems. In some cases, Poti’s work is subject to delays and congestion at other points along the route: in Central Asia, on the Caspian Sea and in Baku. There are also difficulties due to bureaucratic issues and differences in time procedures between countries, and delays slow down the speed of cargo transportation. If the railway system does not ensure the smooth movement of containers, the port becomes a temporary storage facility. 

The Port of Poti continues to maintain its key position in Georgia and throughout the Caspian-Black Sea transit corridor, serving as the country’s main container transport hub and an important link in the regional logistics chain. Thus, the strategic development of Poti should encompass not only physical modernization but also the optimization of the entire logistics chain. It is obvious that the efficiency of the Port of Poti cannot be improved by simply increasing its overall volume. The growth in large-volume bulk cargo creates limited added value, while containerization increases the profitability of individual cargo units, optimizes logistics, and provides predictable and standardized routes for international operators. Thus, from a strategic viewpoint, it is more expedient to develop container routes, modernize rail transport, and establish a predictable tariff policy than to simply increase overall freight turnover. 

Port of Batumi

The Port of Batumi is the largest ferry and cargo port in Georgia, historically specializing in the transportation of oil and liquid cargo. It is also used as a major transit hub for oil refineries in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. Since 2008, it has been managed by the Kazakh company KazTransOil. In 2025, Batumi’s total cargo turnover amounted to approximately 7.3 million tons (including the oil terminal) and its total annual cargo turnover amounted to 18 million tons. The Batumi port container terminal handled 109,600 containers in 2025, and received 660 ships, which is a record high since 2016. 108 more ships entered the port compared to 2024. 

The Port of Batumi has a container terminal, a ferry terminal,  and terminals for dry cargo and passengers. Normally, the Port of Batumi can handle 700,000  tons of cargo per year, and during peak periods, up to 2 million tons and approximately 180,000 passengers.  

The main competitors of the Port of Batumi in the Black Sea region are the Ukrainian ports of Odessa and Ilyichevsk, as well as the Russian ports of Novorossiysk and Tuapse. Unlike the Ukrainian and Russian sectors, the Port of Batumi is located in a more favorable climatic location. 

The Port of Batumi is deeper than the Port of Poti (by approximately 12-14 meters in some places), which allows it to accommodate larger vessels. However, the port does not have a developed large-scale container infrastructure and is not designed to handle containers. The port is located in an urban environment, which is an additional obstacle to the expansion of terminals and storage areas. 

Both Poti and Batumi perform different functions and are not competitors: each of them is responsible for a specific market segment. It is worth noting that, given the further development of ports, the Georgian government has long sought to construct a third deep-water port in Anaklia. 

Port of Anaklia

The Port of Anaklia is a strategically important deep-water development project on the Black Sea coast in western Georgia. The idea of building a deep-water port in Anaklia was discussed as early as the 1960s-1970s. The project was periodically raised at the state level from 2011-2014, as part of the country’s economic development and investment attracting strategy. The Anaklia project is being developed as a modern deep-water port capable of accommodating large container ships and handling up to 7 million tons of cargo in the initial stage of operation. This port is designed to serve international container lines and large transit flows from Central Asia and the Caspian region.  In this context, Lasha Abashidze, general director of Georgian Railways, announced in December 2025 that they plan to build railway infrastructure to the Port of Anaklia in the near future.   

In 2013-2014, the government conducted a feasibility study and decided to announce an international tender for the project’s implementation. In 2016, the Anaklia Development Consortium (ADC), a joint Georgian-American company, won the construction tender. However, the project encountered serious difficulties in 2018-2019.  The consortium faced difficulties in securing the required financing, as funding was delayed and investors requested additional economic analysis. At the same time, the Georgian government launched an investigation into the activities of ADC’s management, including Mamuka Khazaradze, which led to criminal charges being brought against the consortium’s leaders and the withdrawal of American partners from the project. These events worsened the situation and reduced the interest of potential international investors. In January 2020, Georgia officially terminated its contract with the Anaklia Development Consortium, citing failure to fulfill project conditions and financial obligations. The contract was terminated, and the consortium initiated arbitration proceedings in an international court to recover its investment.   

After the initial contract was terminated, the project remained “frozen” until 2023-2024, when the Georgian authorities restored state control and announced a tender. In May 2024, the Ministry of Economy announced that the Chinese state-owned company China Communications Construction Company Limited (CCCC) was selected to build the Port of Anaklia. Discussions about this company’s reputation have raised concerns both in Georgia and among international partners. Vera Kobalia, former Georgian Economy Minister, notes that “the company was involved in corrupt deals in Shri-Lanka and Bangladesh, for which the World Bank imposed 10-year sanctions on it.” 

Since 2024, Belgian marine infrastructure construction company Jan De Nul has been designing a port deepening and breakwater in Anaklia. The government planned to complete the first stage of construction by 2029, after which the port would be able to handle around 600,000 containers per year.  

According to official plans, once operational, the Port of Anaklia will become a deep-water logistics hub capable of handling more than 1 million containers per year, strengthening Georgia’s role as a transit hub on international routes between Asia and Europe. 

Large ships cannot enter the ports of Poti and Batumi, and renting small ships is almost as expensive. This increases the freight owner’s transportation costs and therefore somewhat reduces the advantage of a physically shorter route. Some analyses have shown that the ability to serve large ships through a deep-water port will reduce shipping costs by approximately $160 per container.  At this stage, Chinese financing for the project in Anaklia has practically ceased, and the future of this infrastructure remains unclear. 

Kulevi and Supsa terminals

The Supsa Terminal is the endpoint of the Baku-Supsa pipeline: it was opened in 1999 in the village of Supsa. The terminal was nationalized by Georgia and is managed by the Georgian Pipeline Company, but the company operates it on behalf of the Azerbaijan International Operating Company and its shareholders. Terminal has four warehouses, each with a capacity of 40,000 tons. In 2015, cargo turnover was 4.2 million tons, and annual cargo turnover was 7 million tons. 

Construction of the Black Sea terminal by Kulevi began in 2000, and the terminal was opened on May 16, 2008. Since 2008, it has been owned by the Azerbaijani state-owned company SOCAR. The terminal’s throughput capacity is up to 10 million tons of petroleum products per year. In 2025, an oil refinery was opened here, which shipped 2.2 million tons of oil and petroleum products.  

Port Kulevi has recently been the focus of international attention several times due to its alleged ties to Russia. In October 2025, Reuters reported that Russian oil company RussNeft (Русснефть) has delivered its first shipment of oil to the newly built Kulevi oil refinery. The European Union is considering imposing sanctions on the port of Kulevi as part of its 20th package of sanctions. The European Commission has already prepared a corresponding proposal and provides for restrictions on operations with four specific terminals, including Kulevi. According to this document, the Georgian port is used for the maritime transport of crude oil and petroleum products supplied by Russia or Russian tankers, using “irregular and high-risk schemes.” According to Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, the government does not believe that any activities violating international sanctions are taking place at the port of Kulevi. However, Italy and Hungary oppose the imposition of sanctions. According to Bloomberg, Hungary and Italy have expressed concern over the imposition of sanctions against the Port of Kulevi. The agency’s sources said that Italy’s disagreements with the imposition of sanctions against the Port of Kulevi is linked to Azerbaijan, as Italy also receives Azerbaijani gas. 

Tbilisi Dry Port

Despite its advantageous geographical position, Georgia does not rely solely on seaports as its main logistical resource. Ports account for approximately 35% of the country’s total cargo turnover, and the Georgian transport corridor functions effectively thanks to the joint efforts of the railway, road and port infrastructure. 83-88% of containers from ports are transported by road and 12-17% by rail. Tbilisi Dry Port, which was launched in the summer of 2025, plays an important role in this system. It includes a container terminal with a total area of approximately 44,000 m², with a design capacity of up to 200,000 containers per year. There is also a 12,000 m² platform designed for storing empty containers and parking trucks. It has a capacity of up to 3000 containers and/or up to 1000 vehicles. The introduction of regular container block trains three times a week on the Poti-Tbilisi-Poti route by Georgian Railways has contributed to the growth of rail container traffic since August 2025. According to preliminary estimates, if the current trend continues, the share of container transport in the railway sector will increase by 20-25%. However, road transport will remain dominant.  

Tbilisi Dry Port is an inland container terminal connected to the ports of Batumi and Poti. It has direct rail connections to ports and ensures the efficient functioning of the “seaports-railways-road transport” traffic network. The main function of an inland port is to unload and redistribute containers from seaports. Containers arriving at ports are transported by rail to Tbilisi, where they are sorted and sent either to the domestic market in Georgia or by rail to Armenia and Azerbaijan. This mechanism reduces transportation costs from Poti and Batumi by up to 10% and reduces container downtime at the port, increasing actual throughput without physically expanding port infrastructure. In addition, dry port regulates the asymmetry of transport flows: maritime transport is wave-like in nature ( ships arrive in groups), while railways operate on a schedule. In Tbilisi, containers are stacked and form a single load for further transportation by rail, which increases the efficiency of the railway network and reduces the load on road transport. Road transport is mainly used only for delivery to the final destination, which reduces logistics costs and ensures speed and predictability of freight schedules. 

The growth in container traffic in the Middle Corridor is due to the simultaneous development of container infrastructure along the entire corridor. In this context, the Tbilisi Dry Port plays a key role in the development of the transport sector both at the national level and along the entire transport corridor.    

Georgian transport communications 

The South Caucasus has enormous transit potential, which is not fully utilized. It is a link between the South, North, East, and West, which is why the region is currently attracting considerable interest from international players. It should be noted that the main competition in this area is between China’s Belt and Road Initiative (East-West), the European TRACECA project, the Middle Corridor project, and the North-South project. It should be noted that Georgia also participates in all these programs. Tbilisi positions itself as a transport hub between Europe and Asia and is actively working to modernize transport routes. Most of the $1 billion in loans received from the Asian Development Bank are being used for East-West and North-South transport routes. The East-West Route is part of European transit roads  E60, E97 and E117 and is also integrated into China’s Belt and Road initiative. In Georgia, the E-60 route begins at the Azerbaijani border and extends to the Port of Poti. From there, the road continues to the Turkish border. The East-West or European transit E-60 ranks second in length. The route begins in Brest, France and ends in Irkeshtam, Kyrgyzstan. 

In July 2021, the European Investment Bank granted the Georgian government an additional loan of €106.7 million for the reconstruction of the country’s main highway, the East-West Highway (E60). The European Bank will finance two sections of the East-West Highway, extending to the borders with Armenia and Azerbaijan. According to the official explanation, the investment will improve the safety of the 388-km highway in Georgia. The loan will be used to finance the construction of a 30-km road between Algeti and Sadakhlo (border with Armenia) and a 32-km road between Rustavi and the Red Bridge (border with Azerbaijan). This program will improve road safety, reduce travel time, and lower fuel and maintenance costs for trucks. 

The East-West route accounts for more than 60% of transit trade and freight traffic. The North-South route largely provides for Armenian-Russian trade, so the expediency of spending funds on this route has been repeatedly raised in Georgian expert, public and other circles, especially recently, when the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) route, created as part of the normalization of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, which could bypass Georgia.  

Given the current situation, strengthening its position as a regional hub and a link between Europe and Asia has become a priority for Georgia. In January 2026, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze stated at an event dedicated to International Border Guard Day that Georgia, as a natural gateway at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, is a reliable hub for landlocked countries.   

“Our goal is to transform Georgia into a multifunctional regional hub. This strategy is based on large-scale infrastructure projects. The East-West Highway, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, dry ports and the Anaklia Port project will help strengthen Georgia’s role in the Middle Corridor.” 

As part of this program, a number of roads have been modernized and Prime Minister Kobakhidze noted in an interview with Imedi that the development of road infrastructure is actively continuing, and the construction of the for-lane Tbilisi-Batumi highway will be almost completely finalized next year. He noted that by the end of 2030, it is planned to complete the construction of almost all expressways from the Turkish border to the borders of Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as in the directions of Kakheti and Tbilisi-Lars. Kobakhidze emphasized that all these programs are aimed at maximizing Georgia’s transit potential, which is important in the current geopolitical conditions. According to Kobakhidze, deepening trade and economic ties with Central Asia and neighboring countries will also contribute to the country’s economic development.   

Georgia’s role as a transport corridor is ensured by its transit-oriented railway. The main highway runs from East to West, connecting the Azerbaijani border via Tbilisi with the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi. Thus, the railway is a key link between the Caspian Sea region and the  Black Sea. Another important line is Tbilisi-Kars, part of the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway, providing access to Turkey and then to Europe. Over 14 years, the road section from Tbilisi to Makhinjauri on the Adjara coast was modernized, with the principal achievement being the reconstruction of the central, mountainous, and technically challenging mountain pass connecting eastern and western Georgia. The modernization of the latter has increased cargo turnover to 48 million tons per year, placing Georgia in a more advantageous position within the “Middle Corridor”. Before the upgrade, the Georgian railway operated at 70% capacity, and in 2024, the freight volume transported amounted to 13.6 million tons. It is noteworthy that a Chinese company carried out the modernization. According to Chinese sources, Georgia plans to invest another $2.5 billion in modernizing the railway and purchasing electric locomotives and wagons. Despite all this, the problems of the Georgian railway remain unresolved. The main problem with the railway is not only infrastructure limitations, but also, above all, the capacity of narrow sections and insufficient coordination across the entire transport chain. Even after significant investments in network modernization and capacity expansion, Georgian railways still operate well below their potential, reducing the efficiency of transit flows. The Georgian route still lags behind the Russian one: according to a 2023 World Bank study, the Middle Corridor remains less competitive than the Northern Route in terms of cost and transit time. For instance, transporting one large container from China to Europe via the Middle Corridor costs $2,500- $3,250, whereas the route through Russia offers a fixed price of $2,599 in the eastbound direction and $3,121 in the westbound direction. The transit time for goods to Europe via the Middle Corridor is approximately 20-25 days; by comparison, transporting goods from China to Europe by rail via Kazakhstan, Russia, and Belarus can take around 9 days. These factors clearly show that the Middle Corridor cannot develop further without improving efficiency, which should include reducing transportation time and establishing clear pricing. 

Georgian port infrastructure plays a central role in the development of the Middle Corridor. According to research by experts Tornike Sharashenidze and Giorgi Cherkezishvili, Georgian ports on the Black Sea offer some of the most expensive services in the region. As mentioned above, these are technical problems related to access to port terminals by rail and road, which significantly reduce service efficiency. Meanwhile, Caspian Sea ports also face significant challenges, including outdated infrastructure, limited operational efficiency, and sea level rise. There are a number of other factors that reduce the effectiveness of the Middle Corridor: the lack of a unified management and coordination mechanism between the countries of the Middle Corridor. Furthermore, limited financial capacity in Kazakhstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan, particularly among state-owned railway and port operators, which are heavily dependent on state or international financing due to their debt burdens, has affected investor confidence. However, one of the main problems of the Middle Corridor remains the lack of electronic data exchange and the inefficiency of railway operators, which can cause significant delays in the delivery of goods via the Middle Corridor. The main problem is the lack of integration between the digital system used in ports and the system used for planning and operating railways in ports. This problem hinders effective coordination between arriving and departing trains. The challenges of digitalization are particularly evident in customs procedures. Customs and border services often operate on different platforms and use different data standards, which requires manual verification and duplication of documents. These discrepancies not only increase customs clearance time, but also contribute to the overall unpredictability of the transit process.   

A more significant disadvantage of the Middle Corridor (compared to the Northern Russian alternative) is that the route is multimodal, involving both rail and sea transport across the Caspian (or Black Sea) and passing through the territories of many countries. Consequently, it is necessary to effectively coordinate the actions of a large number of stakeholders and ensure that common transport standards are maintained throughout the cross-border transport chain, including through the use of digital technologies.  Another challenge complicating the efficient movement of goods along the Middle Corridor is logistics, which is associated with costs due to insufficient infrastructure development. Thus, in addition to changing the rail gauge (the standard gauge in China and Europe is 1435 mm, while in the post-Soviet space it is 1520 mm), it is necessary to combine passage across the Caspian Sea with the transshipment of containers or the loading of railway cars onto railway ferries. Next, it is necessary to cross the Black Sea, where the limited capacity of the ports of Poti and Batumi poses an obstacle, as they are not classified as deep-water ports. If the Black Sea is not used, the Baku-Tbilisi-Kars railway line can be used, but this option requires cargo to pass through eastern Turkey, where firstly the railway network is in poor condition, it is necessary to change the rolling stock again (the width of the railway gauge in Turkey is also 1435 mm), and secondly, the final destinations will be the overloaded ports of the Bosphorus or the southern coast of Turkey.  

In the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, part of the transit was moved south. 

An analysis of statistical data for 2019–2024 reveals structural changes in Georgia’s transport system, reflected in different dynamics between the railway and port sectors.  

During the reporting period, rail freight traffic grew by approximately 26% compared to 2019. Growth was particularly significant in 2022 (36% compared to 2019), which indicates not cyclical fluctuations, but a probable structural redistribution of freight flows caused by the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Following 2023-2024, volumes stabilized, indicating the consolidation of a new level of transport activity.   

Seaport cargo turnover declined from 17.22 million tons in 2019 to 13.9 million tons in 2023, after which it partially recovered to 15.6 million tons in 2024. This is clearly shown in the data in the first table.  

Table 1։ Georgia’s freight traffic in million tons/ year 2019-2024, according to data from the National Statistical Service of Georgia. 

TRIPP: A competitor or an addition to Georgia? 

The Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of Azerbaijan signed a peace agreement on August 8, 2025, in Washington, with the mediation of the U.S. President, which laid the foundation for the opening of internal, bilateral and international transport communications. The goal of the TRIPP project is to establish seamless, multimodal transit connectivity within Armenia that promotes regional peace, stability, and integration based on respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdiction of states. Georgia’s official reaction to the peace agreement was rather restrained compared to the opposition’s activity. Official statements outlining the state’s position noted that it was based on “Georgia’s unwavering support for strengthening peace and cooperation in the region, as well as on the fact that the country has always expressed its willingness to contribute to the process of promoting peace and constructive cooperation in the region.”      

It should be noted that since the document was signed on August 8, 2025, Georgia’s political leadership has frequently referred to the agreement in its statements and, in this context, to the possible unblocking of infrastructure and communications. It is noteworthy that the statements made by the Prime Minister of Georgia, the Speaker of Parliament, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have changed significantly in recent months. Previously, official statements focused mainly on the aforementioned document and prospects for regional peace, but in recent months, high-ranking Georgian officials have also considered infrastructure projects to be key, along with the Armenian-Azerbaijani settlement. Furthermore, it is emphasized that Tbilisi is not only following these processes but is also actively participating in their implementation. This is also evidenced by reports from the U.S. Embassy in Georgia, which emphasize that a number of American officials have repeatedly discussed with the Georgian side what role Georgia could play in the implementation of the TRIPP project.       

The reaction of the Georgian public to this project has been mixed, and research shows that the views of the opposition and experts do not coincide with the position of the state. Thus, the opposition is concerned about Georgia’s possible loss of its transit function, its removal from geopolitical events, and the loss of the United States’ exclusive role in the region. Experts often propose clear action plans that could help Georgia play an important role in the infrastructure sector in the coming years. Many experts note that the infrastructure passing through southern Armenia is currently not ready, and this may help Georgia accelerate the commissioning of its own infrastructure in the coming years and prepare for new realities.    

It is noteworthy that the Georgian Foreign Minister emphasized in one of his recent interviews that Georgia’s strategic position makes the country a key hub, and no new path or direction can weaken Georgia’s potential in this regard. “I really do not see any risk in this, and it is unacceptable for us to live in fear that someone will intimidate us so much that Georgia will disappear from the world map. One can only doubt the awareness of those people who talk about channels today and fail to mention the main link to Europe — Georgia. Rather, they do not mention it, but deliberately try to undermine this path, attempting, on the contrary, to somehow disrupt it, when there is no other alternative today. Or rather, they do not mention it when there is no other alternative today”.   

The minister emphasized that the construction of new roads is of great importance for the region. “Whatever we may say, there are currently intense discussions about the construction of new routes along the Azerbaijan-Armenia corridor, and we can say with confidence and calm that this is beneficial for the region. If this develops and a new road appears in our region, the value of our region in terms of transport accessibility will only increase. However, it is impossible to imagine that any road could replace Georgia, as this road has existed, functioned and developed for a long time. Every year, the demand for it grows rather than decreases. Even if we add three or four more routes, it will still not be enough for everything that is happening today in terms of freight traffic between the West and the East,” the minister noted.  

Conclusion

Georgia’s transport infrastructure is a strategically important element of the region, providing both internal connections within the country and a transit trade system between Central Asia, the Caspian Sea ad Europe. The country occupies an important position between Asia and Europe. In recent years, large-scale modernization programs have been implemented: the construction of an east-west highway, partial modernization of the railway and the creation of a dry port. In this context, it can be said that work has begun on resuming operations at the deep-water port of Anaklia. However, despite these initiatives, the system still faces structural problems in certain areas, such as limited port depth, insufficient railway loading, bottleneck capacity, insufficient multimodal coordination, and a lack of digital integration.  

The competitiveness of the Georgian transport corridor compared to northern routes (routes through Russia) remains limited due to high transport costs, long transit times, and the complexity of the multimodal system. A comparative analysis of transport prices and transit times shows that the multimodal nature of transport, the crossing of the Caspian and Black Seas, and the existence of different standards and customs systems increase the final cost and reduce competitiveness. Therefore, without unified management mechanisms and deeper digitalization, the Middle Corridor will not be able to fully compete with alternative routes. 

The emergence of the TRIPP initiative significantly alters the regional transit balance. Whereas Georgia previously acted as the main and almost monopolistic link on the Caspian-Black Sea route, the formation of a possible new route through Armenian territory creates a competitive environment. This does not mean an immediate loss of transit traffic, but it effectively eliminates  Georgia’s transit monopoly and increases opportunities for multilateral political and economic influence in the region. At the same time, the current level of implementation of the TRIPP infrastructure is not yet entirely clear: over the next year, it will become clearer what scale of investment and practical work will actually be carried out in this area. Only after this stage will it be possible to assess whether TRIPP will become an additional backup route or whether it will change the region’s transport capabilities.   

Thus, Georgia is in a transitional period: on the one hand, large scale infrastructure projects are being implemented, while on the other hand, systemic vulnerabilities remain and a new competitive environment is forming in the region. Georgia’s transport system remains a key transit hub in the region, but fully exploiting its strategic importance depends not only on the physical development of infrastructure, but also on the optimization, digitalization and effective coordination of the entire transport chain with international partners, as well as on the further development of TRIPP.   

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13. Jamestown, Georgia Attempts to Revive Strategic Anaklia Deep-Sea Port Project   https://jamestown.org/georgia-attempts-to-revive-strategic-anaklia-deep-sea-port-project/?utm_source=chatgpt.com  

14.  TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL,The Anaklia port to be built by a Chinese company with suspicious reputation, https://transparency.ge/en/post/anaklia-port-be-built-chinese-company-suspicious-reputation?utm_source=chatgpt.com  

15.  МИНИСТЕРСТВО ЭКОНОМИКИ И УСТОЙЧИВОГО РАЗВИТИЯ ГРУЗИИ, Бельгийская компания Jan De Nul выбрана победителем тендера на проектирование и строительство морской инфраструктуры глубоководного порта Анаклия., https://www.economy.ge/?page=news&nw=2560&lang=en  

16.  1tv, Ираклий Кобахидзе - Первая фаза строительства порта Анаклия будет завершена не позднее 2029 года, после чего порт будет обслуживать более 600 тысяч контейнеров в год, https://1tv.ge/lang/ru/news/iraklij-kobakhidze-pervaja-faza-stroitelstva-porta-anaklija-budet-zavershena-ne-pozdnee-2029-goda-posle-chego-port-budet-obsluzhivat-bolee-600-tysjach-kontejnerov-v-god/?utm_source=chatgpt.com  

17.  BUSINESS MEDIA,  Порт Анаклия будет обрабатывать не менее 1 миллиона TEU 

18. к 2035 году - Мариам Квривишвили, https://bm.ge/ru/news/port-anakliia-budet-obrabatyvat-ne-menee-1-milliona-կոնտեյներ-k-2035-godu-mariam-kvrivisvili?utm_source=chatgpt.com  

19.  A PORT COMMUNITY SYSTEM OF GEORGIA AND ITS ROLE IN WORLD MARITIME TRANSPORT, https://stumejournals.com/journals/tm/2018/3/131.full.pdf  

20.  bp, Supsa terminal, https://www.bp.com/en_az/azerbaijan/home/who-we-are/operationsprojects/terminals/supsa-terminal.html  

21.  Reuters: Russia ships first oil to new refinery in Georgia, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-ships-first-oil-new-refinery-georgia-2025-10-21/ 

22. Владимир Бегунков, ЕС обсуждает санкции против портов Грузии и Индонезии, DW, https://www.dw.com/ru/es-obsuzdaet-sankcii-protiv-portov-gruzii-i-indonezii-za-torgovlu-rossijskoj-neftu/a-75886766  

23.  BUSINESS MEDIA, Кто выступает против санкций ЕС в отношении порта Кулеви?,  https://bm.ge/news/vin-etsinaaghmdegeba-eu-shi-yulevis-portis-sanqtsirebas-bloomberg  

24.  Bloomberg, EU Countries' Resistance Risks Blunting Latest Russia Sanctions, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-02-17/eu-countries-resistance-risks-blunting-latest-russia-sanctions  

25.   VIII INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE. BEIJING. CHINA 30.04-01.05.2024 , PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF GEORGIA SEAPORTS IN THE CONDITIONS OF DIVERSIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL ROUTES Lasha Gadilia, 26-29, https://www.sconferences.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/Beijing.China-8.pdf#page=27  

26.  TBILISI DRY PORT, https://www.tbilisidryport.com/tbilisi-dry-port  

27. MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF GEORGIA, Levan Davitashvili: Tbilisi Dry Port project is a significant signal denoting great potential and proper development of the Middle Corridor, https://www.economy.ge/index.php?page=news&nw=2618&lang=en  

28.  Внешнеполитической стратегии на 2019–2022 годы и Концепции национальной безопасности Грузии 2011 

29.  Georgia’s highway dilemmas and  the Asian Development Bank https://bankwatch.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/2024_04_Georgias-highway-dilemmas-and-the-Asian-Development-Bank_final.pdf  

30.  Georgiatoday, Investing in Georgia’s East-West Highway – the Country’s Key Trade and Transport Artery, https://georgiatoday.ge/investing-in-georgias-east-west-highway-the-countrys-key-trade-and-transport-artery/  

31. Эхо Кавказа, Саакашвили отреагировал на обсуждение прямых перевозок между Арменией и Азербайджаном, https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/saakashvili-otreagiroval-na-obsuzhdenie-pryamyh-perevozok-mezhdu-armeniey-i-azerbaydzhanom/33658892.html  

32.  bm, Планируется визит высокого уровня из Вашингтона в Баку и Ереван, Грузия в повестке дня не включена | Хидашели, https://bm.ge/news/vashingtonidan-baqosa-da-erevanshi-maghali-donis-viziti-igegmeba-saqartvelo-dghis-tsesrigshi-araa-khidasheli  

33. „თბილისი დრაი პორტი“ – ნავსადგურებში დამუშავებული საკონტეინერო ნაკადის ბლოკმატარებლებით გადაზიდვების სტაბილურ ზრდას უზრუნველყოფს, https://transcor.ge/თბილისი-დრაი-პორტი-ნავ/  

34.  ORBELI center, Georgia’s Transport Policy at a Geopolitical Crossroads, https://orbeli.am/en/post/1473/2025-09-26/Georgia’s+Transport+Policy+at+a+Geopolitical+Crossroads 

35.  EU study maps investment needs to rebuild trade routes between Europe and Central Asia via the Caucasus, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/delegations/armenia/eu-study-maps-investment-needs-rebuild-trade-routes-between-europe-and-central-asia-caucasus_en  

36.  Imedinew, Ираклий Кобахидзе: Поздравляю каждого сотрудника Грузинской таможни с профессиональным днем и благодарю вас за высокий профессионализм и государственную ответственность, с которыми вы служите нашей стране., https://imedinews.ge/ge/sazogadoeba/421464/irakli-kobakhidze-propesiul-dges-gilotsavt-saqartvelos-sabajo-samsakhuris-titoeul-tanamshromels-da-madlobas-gikhdit-im-magali-propesionalizmisa-da-sakhelmtsipoebrivi-pasukhismgeblobistvis-romlitats-chvens-qvekanas-emsakhurebit  

37.  Civil Georgia, Georgian Officials Mark Completion of Railway Modernization, Hoping to Boost Transit, https://civil.ge/archives/715937  

38.  SPUTNIK Грузия Модернизация железной дороги Грузии завершается премьер -, https://sputnik-georgia.ru/20250627/modernizatsiya-zheleznoy-dorogi-gruzii-zavershaetsya---premer-293944285.html  

39.   Tornike Sharashenidze, George Cherkezishvili June 2025 The Perspectives of the Middle Corridor in an Age of Global Confrontation and Uncertainty https://southcaucasus.fes.de/fileadmin/Publications/2025/Middle_Corridor_ENG_2025.pdf  

40.  СИНЬХУА Новости,В Грузии введена в эксплуатацию железная дорога, модернизированная китайской компанией, https://russian.news.cn/20251226/d34c576661af4b59b2eed35bfc3e4067/c.html  

41.  CGTN, Китайская компания завершила модернизацию самого сложного участка грузинской ж/д в центре страны, https://russian.cgtn.com/news/2025-12-25/2004204731003748353/index.html  

42.  World Bank Document, СРЕДНИЙТОРГОВОТРАНСПОРТНЫЙКОРИДОР, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099020924131532268/pdf/P180322-ae013e28-595c-4a7a-b2e0-591e01b32487.pdf  

43.  Middle Corridor, Заседания Рабочей группы по развитию Транскаспийского международного транспортного маршрута проведены в Шымкенте, https://middlecorridor.com/ru/press-tsentr/novosti/zasedaniya-rabochej-gruppy-po-razvitiyu-transkaspijskogo-mezhdunarodnogo-transportnogo-marshruta-provedeny-v-shymkente  

44.  Norayr Dunamalyan, ARVAK – Whose interests are served by the Middle Corridor?, https://arvak.am/ում-շահերից-է-բխում-միջին-միջանցքը/  

45.   Tornike Sharashenidze, George Cherkezishvili June 2025 The Perspectives of the Middle Corridor in an Age of Global Confrontation and Uncertainty https://southcaucasus.fes.de/fileadmin/Publications/2025/Middle_Corridor_ENG_2025.pdf  

46.   Каримов Ш.И. Ключевые риски развития транспортно-логистического проекта «Средний коридор» // Общество: политика, экономика, право. 2024. № 1. С. 48–53. https://doi.org/10.24158/pep.2024.1.6  

47.   Kalyuzhovna Y., Pomfret R. Trade Corridors in the Caspian Region: Present and Future. Asian Development Bank Institute: Working Paper № 1266 [Электронный ресурс] // Asian Development Bank. https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/705216/adbi-wp1266.pdf   

48.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia, Joint Statement on the Publication of the Armenia-U.S. Implementation Framework for the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), https://www.mfa.am/hy/press-releases/2026/01/14/TRIPP/13721  

49.  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia Welcomes the Historic Agreement on Establishment of Peace and Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia Mediated by Donald Trump, https://mfa.gov.ge/en/news/174624-saqartvelos-sagareo-saqmeta-saministro-miesalmeba-2025-tslis-8-agvistos-vashingtonshi-ashsh-is-prezi  

50.  ARVAK, Hasmik Meliksetyan, Georgia’s political, expert and media reaction to the initialing of the Peace Agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan and further developments, https://arvak.am/վրաստանի-քաղաքական-փորձագիտական-և-մե/  

51. BUSINESSMEDIA, Agreement Should Not Be Signed With Chinese CCCC On The Construction Of Anaklia Port – Vera Kobalia, https://bm.ge/en/news/agreement-should-not-be-signed-with-chinese-cccc-on-the-construction-of-anaklia-port-vera-kobalia  

52. NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE OF GEORGIA, Service Statistics, https://www.geostat.ge/en/modules/categories/387/service-statistics299